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Abstract
This paper aims at characterizing the conditions of wind power deployment in order to
infer a carbon price level that would provide wind power with comparable advantage over
fossil fuel technologies as effective wind support policies. The analysis is conducted on
Danish data from 2000 to 2010, i.e. after market liberalization took place in 2000. Probit
technique is used to analyze the connection of new turbines to the grid each month and
tobit analysis is employed on the additional capacity installed monthly. I find that the
level and type of the support policy are the dominant drivers of deployment. Electricity
price impact is not visible. The investment cost impact is not significant either, but the
effect of the interest rate, although not visible in the probit analysis, is significant in the
tobit analysis. The number of turbines already installed, that is taken as a proxy for the
sites availability, does not have any significant effect either. A feed-in tariff significantly
brings more wind power in than a premium policy. The fact that the support policy is
a feed-in tariff rather than a premium increases the additional capacity installed monthly
by up to several tens MW. The additional capacity installed monthly increases by up to
thousand kW for each additional e/MWh of support. If the policy is a premium, I find that
24 e/MWh of support in addition to electricity price is needed to observe the connection
of new turbines to the grid with a 0.5 probability. I convert this support level into a carbon price of 28 e/ton if wind power competes with coal, and 50 e/t if it competes with gas.
Keywords:
Wind power; renewable energy; subsidy; carbon price; feed-in tariff; emissions trading;
climate policy.
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1.1

Introduction
Context

In Europe, the climate and energy package aims at meeting the European Union (EU) climate and
energy targets. The 2020 package included three objectives: reducing the EU greenhouse gases emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels, raising the share of the EU energy consumption produced
from renewable resources to 20%, and improving the energy efficiency in the EU by 20%. Within this
package, national renewable energy (RE) support policies (EU, 2009) have coexisted with a common
carbon market. While the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is designed to curb
carbon emissions, renewable energy support policies aim at increasing the share of renewable energy
sources in total energy consumption. However, renewable energy resources are not necessarily the
most efficient way to decrease carbon emissions. As the 2030 climate and energy package is discussed,
the debate on the coexistence of an emissions trading scheme and renewable energy targets is back.
Palmer and Burtraw (2005) as well as Fischer and Newell (2008) underline that, if the main goal is
to reduce greenhouse gases emissions, renewable energy support policies are less cost-effective than a
cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. Energy consumption reduction as well as efficiency improvement might be other ways to reduce emissions. The coexistence of these instruments raises several
questions. What is the actual abatement cost of renewable energy support policies? What is their
impact on carbon price? What is the impact of the latter on renewable energy deployment? Do the
instruments mutually reinforce or weaken one another?
Some studies already enlighten these questions. For example, Marcantonini and Ellerman (2013)
calculate the annual CO2 abatement cost of renewable energy incentive in Germany in the time period
2006-2010. They find that CO2 abatement cost of wind power is relatively low (the average for 20062010 is 43 e/tCO2 ) while CO2 abatement cost for solar energy is very high (the average for 2006-2010
2

is 537 e/tCO2 ). Fischer and Preonas (2010) develop a theoretical framework to explain interactions
between overlapping energy and climate policies. Morris (2009) shows that, in the U.S., a renewable
energy portfolio standard (RPS) in addition to an emission trading scheme would increase welfare cost
compared to a trading scheme alone. The reason is the RPS reduces the flexibility for power producers
to choose the cheapest abatement solutions. Other studies on the United States case question the
usefulness to have renewable energy policies in parallel of a national cap-and-trade system (Paltsev
et al., 2009; McGuiness and Ellerman, 2008). On the European case, Weigt et al. (2012) model the
German power sector to analyze the carbon abatement due to renewable energy in Germany and the
impact of carbon price on this, for the time period 2006-2010. They estimate that CO2 emissions from
the electricity sector are reduced by 10 to 16% of what estimated emissions would have been without
any RE policy. They also find that the abatement attributable to RE injection is 4 to 10% greater
in the presence of a carbon price than otherwise. In conclusion, Weigt et al. actually find that both
instruments reinforce one another.
Relative to the impact of renewable support policies, and the carbon price level that would have
comparable effect, Blanco and Rodrigues (2008) compute a carbon credit level equivalent to each
national wind support policy in effect in Europe in 2006. Their analysis includes the 27 member states
of the European Union. They use assumptions on the amount of greenhouse gases avoided by wind
energy but they do not take account of the actual impact of each policy on wind power deployment.
On the other hand, many studies compare the impact of various types of renewable support policies,
without necessarily taking into account the stringency level of each of them. It is the case of Menz
and Vachon (2006) on the United States experience.

1.2

Main question addressed

The purpose of the work presented here is to analyze the conditions that lead to wind power deployment, to infer the carbon price level that would provide wind power with a comparable price advantage
over fossil technologies, and to compare this level with the carbon price observed in the second phase of
the EU-ETS. The analysis focuses on Denmark, which has a long wind power history including several
support policy changes over time. The wind power profit function is used to identify the parameters
that might impact wind power deployment. A discrete choice econometric model (probit) is employed
to test the effect of these parameters on new on-shore2 wind turbine connections to the grid on a
monthly basis for the time period 2000-2010, i.e. after the market liberalization that took place in
1999.3 Tobit technique is used to estimate the effect of the same parameters on the additional wind
power capacity installed each month. The probit estimates allow calculating the probability of new
connections to the grid as a function of the support policy type and level. The support level needed
to attain wind power deployment with a probability of 0.5 can be converted into a carbon price that
would provide wind power producers with a comparable price advantage compared to coal or gas power
plant owners. This carbon price is computed from the difference in profitability between renewable
and fossil fuel technologies.

1.3

Structure

In Section 2, the history of wind power in Denmark is presented as the context of the work. At the
aggregate level, the observation of wind capacity over time in parallel with the support policy changes
2 On-shore wind capacity and generation were respectively 2.82 GW and 5.072 TWh in Denmark in 2009, compared
to 0.662 GW and 1.644 TWh for off-shore wind. Total power capacity was approaching 13 GW in 2009 and total power
generation was 34 TWh (see Figures 1 and 4).
3 The choice is made to focus on on-shore wind power only as off-shore wind power is significantly different, for
example in terms of cost and grid infrastructure development.
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already provides some indications about the impact of the various types of support and about the
support level needed to have wind power deployment.
The econometric analysis that quantifies these impacts is presented in Section 3. The model that is
used is based on the profit function for wind energy. The database preparation is explained. The
results of the probit and tobit analysis are presented. The robustness of these results is discussed.
In Section 4, the comparison between the profits expected from wind power projects and fossil fuel
power plants is used to compute a carbon price that would provide wind power producers with a price
advantage comparable to the support level needed to see new connections of turbines to the grid with
probability 0.5.

2

Wind energy in Denmark

Denmark is chosen for its long wind power history, the frequency of changes in the type and level of
its wind support policies and the large amount of data available for wind energy.
On shore wind support policies began in Denmark in 1976 (Energistyrelsen; Jaureguy-Naudin, 2010).
They are summarized in Table 1. Between 1976 and 2000, several policies juxtaposed each other and
sometimes overlapped. From 1976 to 1989, the Danish state reimbursed part of the investment for
building wind turbines. The support was originally 40% of the investment cost and was then reduced
gradually until the scheme was cancelled in 1989. From 1984 to 2001, the electricity price paid to
producers of wind power was 85% of the local retail price of electricity excluding taxes. In 1991, a
fixed price premium of 36 e/MWh was introduced in addition to the previous scheme. It was in place
until 2001.
In 1999, the Danish electricity market was liberalized. Existing turbines were then covered by a special
feed-in tariff (FIT)4 which resulted in a comparable income for producers as under the previous support
scheme. For existing wind turbines connected before the end of 1999, producers received a feed in tariff
of 80 e/MWh for a number of full load hours (25,000 full load hours for turbines below 200 kW, 15,000
full load hours for turbines below 600 kW, 10,000 full load hours for turbines larger than 600 kW).
After full load hours were used, producers received a feed-in tariff of 58 e/MWh until the turbine was
ten years old. They then received a price premium of maximum 13 e/MWh until the turbine was 20
years old. The sum of market price and price premium was limited to 48 e/MWh. An additional price
premium of 3 e/MWh was paid to cover balancing costs5 in the electricity market.
From 2000, four policies were successively in place. For turbines connected to the grid between 2000
and 2002, producers received a fixed feed-in tariff of 58 e/MWh for the first 22,000 full load hours.
They then received the wholesale spot market electricity price (37 e/MWh in 2008) in addition to a
premium of 13 e/MWh, until the turbine is 20 years old. The sum of the market price and the price
premium was limited to a maximum of 48 e/MWh. In 2002, the support scheme changed from a
feed-in tariff to a variable premium to better integrate with the recently liberalized electricity market.
For turbines connected to the grid in 2003-2004, the premium scheme was associated with a cap on
the total remuneration per unit of electricity produced. For the first 20 years of the turbine lifetime,
producers received the wholesale spot market electricity price in addition to a premium of 13 e/MWh.
The sum of the market price and the price premium was limited to 48 e/MWh. In 2005, the cap
4 A feed-in tariff is a guaranteed price that power producers receive for every kWh they produce, instead of receiving
the market electricity price. It provides more revenue certainty than a premium policy under which the electricity price
uncertainty remains, despite the premium that is offered on top of it.
5 A producer, for example a wind turbine owner, has to forecast the production in advance and sell it to the power
exchange. Any deviation from the forecasted wind production is covered by means of regulating power. The costs of
offsetting the imbalances in wind power production are charged to turbine owners. The 3 e/MWh allowance is paid to
turbine owners to help them pay these balancing costs.
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on the total remuneration per unit of electricity produced was removed. For turbines connected to
the grid between January 2005 and February 20th 2008, producers received the wholesale spot market
electricity price in addition to a premium of 13 e/MWh for the first 20 years of the turbine lifetime.
In 2008, the current regime came into effect when the premium was increased. For turbines connected
to the grid after February 21st 2008, producers receive the wholesale spot market electricity price in
addition to a premium of 34 e/MWh for the first 25,000 full load hours. Under all four regimes and
for the entire lifetime of the turbine, an additional allowance of 3 e/MWh has been paid to producers
to cover balancing costs.
Aggregate on-shore wind capacity in Denmark in the last decades is presented in Figure 1.6 Its
observation in parallel with the support policy history shows a correspondence between the growth
in capacity and the support scheme: most of the growth in wind capacity occurred either between
1995 and 2002, or after 2008, which means either under a premium of 36 e/MWh, a feed-in tariff
of 58 e/MWh or under a premium of 34 e/MWh. Given electricity prices in 2000-2002, the feed-in
tariff of 58 e/MWh can be seen as equivalent to a premium of more than 30 e/MWh, under revenue
certainty equivalence. This suggests a threshold effect, that is to say, the existence of a support level
above which new turbines are connected to the grid and below which no new connections are made.

6 Data

source: Energistyrelsen.
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Table 1: On-shore wind support policies in Denmark (Source: Jauréguy-Naudin, 2010).
Support scheme

From 1976 to 1989

Financial support from the Danish state.

From 1984 to 2001

Electricity price paid to producers: 85% of the local retail price,
excluding taxes.

From 1991 to 2001

Fixed premium of 36 e/MWh in addition to the previous scheme.

Existing turbines bought
before the end of 1999

Feed-in tariff of 80 e/MWh for a number of full load hours.
Then feed-in tariff of 58 e/MWh until the turbine is 10 years old.
Then premium of 13 e/MWh or less until the turbine is 20 years old.

From 2000 to 2002

Feed-in tariff of 58 e/MWh for 22,000 full load hours.
Then premium of 13 e/MWh or less untile the turbine is 20 years old
with a limit of 48 e/MWh on the sum of market price and premium.
Additional premium of 3 e/MWh.

From 2003 to 2004

Premium of 13 e/MWh or less until the turbine is 20 years old, with
a limit of 48 e/MWh on the sum of market price and premium.
Additional premium of 3 e/MWh

From 2005 to
February 20th 2008

Fixed premium of 13 e/MWh until the turbine is 20 years old.
Additional premium of 3 e/MWh

After February 21st 2008

Premium of 34 e/MWh for the first 25,000 full load hours.
Additional premium of 3 e/MWh.
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Figure 1: On-shore wind capacity in Denmark since its early stage.
The purpose of the analysis presented in this paper is to take advantage of this diverse history of wind
power in Denmark to quantify the impact of wind support policies and to infer a carbon price that
would attain comparable wind power deployment. Econometric analysis is used to do this empirical
analysis and a discrete choice model is chosen as an appropriate approach to analyze the connection of
new turbines to the grid each month and take account of a possible threshold effect. Tobit analysis on
the additional capacity that is installed monthly complements the results from the probit technique.
The analysis is done for on-shore wind power for the time period 2000-2010. I indeed chose to focus
on the time period after liberalization. The first reason is that, after liberalization, policies are clearly
juxtaposed and they do not overlap. Then, for the econometric estimations, it would not be possible
to find a consistent electricity price time series before and after liberalization. A premium on top of a
government set electricity price is indeed not comparable to a premium on top of a market electricity
price. Finally, the current debate on the coexistence of renewable energy support policies and an
emission trading scheme is conducted in the context of a liberalized electricity market. This work
provides some insights on the issue in this context.

3

Econometric analysis of the conditions of wind power deployment

The econometric analysis uses both probit and tobit techniques. It is based on the profit function for
wind energy producers. After the latter is presented, the econometric model is introduced and the data
preparation is explained. Results are then presented and their robustness is discussed. At this stage,
I do not introduce the comparison between wind power and fossil technologies. Indeed companies like
Vattenfall and DONG Energy that also have activities in thermal power production do own some of
the wind turbines in Denmark, but two thirds of the Danish wind power capacity is actually owned by
individuals (e.g. farmers) who base their decision on a cost-return consideration. Hence, I build the
model for the following econometric analysis on the profit function of wind power only. I introduce
the comparison with the other power production technologies in Section 4.
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3.1

Profit function for wind energy

For power production from technology i, the profit Πi for each kWh produced can be defined as follows:

Πi =

RT
0

(pit + xit − emit − vcit )q(t)e−rt dt − F Ci
RT
q(t)e−rt dt
0

(1)

where:
pit is the electricity price received by power producers at time t,
xit is the potential premium received by producers if technology i is subject to some support policy at
time t,
emit is the emission penalty if technology i produces emissions that are subject to some mitigation
policy at time t,
vcit represents the other variable costs for technology i,
q(t) is the quantity of electricity produced at time t,
r is the discount rate,
F Ci represents the fixed costs for technology i,
and T is the plant lifetime.
Hence Πi can be decomposed in the sum of an electricity price revenue, Pe , and a premium revenue,
Xi , minus emissions costs, Ei , and other costs, Ci , as follows:
(2)

Πi = Pe + Xi − Ei − Ci
where:
RT

pi q(t)e−rt dt
Pe = R0 T t
q(t)e−rt dt
0

(3)

RT

xi q(t)e−rt dt
Xi = R0 T t
q(t)e−rt dt
0
Ei =

Ci =

RT
0

RT

emit q(t)e−rt dt
RT
q(t)e−rt dt
0

0

vct q(t)e−rt dt

RT
0

(4)

q(t)e−rt dt

+ RT
0

F Ci
q(t)e−rt dt

(5)

.

(6)

For a renewable technology r, there is no emission cost and the profit function is
Πr = Pr + Xr − Cr .

For wind power, costs are mainly fixed costs.
8

(7)

Cr ≈ R T
0

F Cr
q(t)e−rt dt

.

(8)

Cr can be approximated by the upfront investment cost. A large part of it is the turbine price, which
depends on the turbine capacity. The quantity of electricity produced is a function of the turbine
capacity as well and the wind power density (W/m2 ) of the site where it is built. Hence Cr is a
function of the investment cost in e/kW divided by the wind power density of the turbine site.

3.2

Econometric model

The decision to build a new turbine depends on the profit that can be expected from it. The decision
is made only if the profit is positive or equal to zero. Hence, given the profit function described above,
this decision may depend on the electricity price projections, the investment cost and the interest rate
when the decision is made to connect a new turbine on a given site. The wind characteristics of the
site that is chosen may also have an influence as well as the availability of good sites.
Although in the four regimes considered between 2000 and 2010, the support policy actually varies
between the main part of the turbine lifetime (i.e. the first 22,000 full load hours for the regime in
place from 2000 to 2002, the first 20 years of operation for the regimes in place from 2003 to February
20th 2008, and the first 25,000 full load hours for the regime in place after February 21st 2008), and
the rest of it, the bulk of the support revenue comes from what is received in the main part of the
turbine lifetime.7 Hence, the support policy I consider for each of these four time periods in the
econometric analysis is the support actually provided in the main part of the turbine lifetime. For
turbines connected to the grid between 2000 and 2002, wind power producers receive a feed-in tariff
of 58 e/MWh, i.e. a fixed tariff that is independent of the electricity price. For turbines connected to
the grid in 2003 and 2004, wind power producers receive a premium of 13 e/MWh or less in addition
to the electricity price. The variable premium is computed as a function of the electricity price: if
electricity price is below 35 e/MWh, the premium is 13 e/MWh; if electricity price is between 35 and
48 e/MWh, the premium is the difference between the electricity price and 48 e/MWh; if electricity
price is above 48 e/MWh, there is no premium. For turbines connected to the grid between 2005 and
February 20th 2008, wind power producers receive a fixed premium of 13 e/MWh in addition to the
price of electricity. For turbines connected after February 21st 2008, power producers receive a fixed
premium of 34 e/MWh in addition to the price of electricity. In addition, for all regimes, wind power
producers receives 3 e/MWh for balancing costs.
In terms of time scale, although the exploration of a site may start up to five years before a turbine is
connected to the grid on that site, there is usually one year between the start of the actual building
of the turbine and the date of connection to the grid. The start of the building of the turbine can be
seen as the point of irreversibility in the decision process. Appropriate lags are taken into account for
the relevant explanatory variables of the econometric analysis as explained later on.
3.2.1

Probit model

Probit analysis is chosen to examine the impact of electricity price projections, the support type (feedin tariff, fixed premium or variable premium), the support level and the levelized cost on the decision
to build a new turbine. This decision is a binary variable and is observed through the connection or
the absence of connection of new turbines to the grid per month. As the electricity price and support
level impacts may vary with the type of support policy that is used, dummy variables are introduced
7 The

typical lifetime of a wind turbine is 20 years.
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to characterize the support policy type and to differentiate the support level and policy type effects.
The econometric model used for the probit analysis is the following:
P rob(Yt = 1|At ) = F (β1 + β2 Elecpricet,−n + β3 Supportt,−n + β4 F IT + β5 V P
+β6 Supportt ∗ F IT + β7 Supportt ∗ V P + β8 Costt,−n + β9 Rt,−n + β10 T otT bt )
(9)
where:
Yt is a binary variable: it is worth 1 if at least one new turbine is connected to the grid in time period
t, it is equal to 0 otherwise.
At is the vector of all explanatory variables considered.
F is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Elecpricet represents electricity price projection at time t.
Supportt is the support level at time t. If the policy type is a fixed premium, Supportt is the premium
itself. If the policy type is a feed-in tariff, the support level is calculated as the difference between the
tariff and the electricity price at time t.
F IT and V P are the dummy variables for the feed-in tariff and the variable premium policies. The
fixed premium policy is taken as the reference category. The variable Supportt ∗ F IT (respectively
Supportt ∗ V P ) is the interaction term between Supportt and the dummy variable F IT (respectively
V P ). In the database, the interaction term between the V P dummy variable and the Supportt variable
was almost perfectly collinear with the VP dummy variable. The reason is that, in 2003 and 2004,
electricity price was such that the support variable as I calculate it is the full premium (13 e/MWh)
for most of the observations during that time period.
Costt is the levelized cost of wind power. For wind power, costs are mainly fixed costs. Levelized cost
can be approximated by the investment cost divided by the quantity of electricity produced during
the turbine lifetime. The investment cost itself is the product of the investment cost in e/kW and
the turbine capacity, while the quantity of electricity produced during the turbine lifetime is function
of the turbine capacity, the turbine lifetime, and the wind potential of the site where the turbine is
built. As a consequence, the levelized cost does not depend on the turbine capacity as higher energy
production compensates for the increase in the turbine price (Bolinger and Wiser, 2011). Neither
wind power density, nor the capacity factor is observed when there is no new connection to the grid.
Investment cost in e/kW is then taken as a proxy for the cost term.
Rt is the interest rate of long-term Danish government bonds.
T otT bt is the number of turbines already installed at time t. It is a proxy for the sites availability:
the higher the number of turbines already installed, the lower the number of remaining sites that are
available.
Lags up to five years are tested for electricity price and up to two years for the support level, interest
rate and cost terms. These values correspond to the length of the decision process to build a new
turbine, as explained in the introduction of Section 3.2. Past electricity prices are used as a proxy for
electricity price projections. I tested the use of forward contracts prices, but the spot market offers
the longest data series (as early as July 1999).
Given the profit function described previously, β2 and β3 are expected to be positive while β8 and
β9 are expected to be negative. Previous comparisons between various types of wind support policies
(for example Menz and Vachon, 2006) conclude that a feed-in tariff regime attains larger wind power
deployment (Couture et al., 2010). For this reason, β4 is expected to be positive. On the contrary, β5
is expected to be negative as a variable premium would provide wind power producers with a lower
revenue certainty than a fixed premium.
10

3.2.2

Tobit model

I use tobit analysis to estimate the effect of the same factors on the additional capacity that is installed
each month. I include the same explanatory variables as for the probit analysis. I add Dec02, a dummy
variable for December 2002, month for which a significantly larger capacity of wind power was installed
(226 MW compared to 10MW on average for the time period 2000-2010).8 The model for the tobit
analysis is the following:

AddCapt = (β1 + β2 Elecpricet,−n + β3 Supportt,−n + β4 F IT + β5 V P
+β6 Supportt ∗ F IT + β7 Supportt ∗ V P + β8 Costt,−n
+β9 Rt,−n + β10 T otT bt + β11 Dec02)∗I[Bt > B ∗ ]

(10)

where:
AddCapt is the additional capacity installed each month,
I[.] is the indicator function, equal to 1 if the relation specified as argument is true, zero otherwise,
Bt is the latent variable defined as:
Bt = β1 + β2 Elecpricet,−n + β3 Supportt,−n + β4 F IT + β5 V P
+β6 Supportt ∗ F IT + β7 Supportt ∗ V P + β8 Costt,−n + β9 Rt,−n
+β10 T otT bt + β11 Dec02
B ∗ is the threshold value of Bt below which no new turbine is connected to the grid.

3.3

Data preparation

A monthly database on the time period 2000-2010 is built. The values of the variables needed for the
econometric analysis and introduced above are defined as follows.
Data on Danish wind turbines come from Energinet (energinet.dk), the Danish transmission system
operator for electricity and natural gas. A large database on all turbines that have been in operation in
Denmark allows identifying the date of connection of each Danish turbine to the grid so that they can
be grouped into monthly observations, in order to define AddCapt , the additional capacity installed
each month, and Yt , the binary variable representing the connection (Yt = 1) or absence of connection
(Yt = 0) of new turbines to the grid in Denmark each month.
Electricity price data come from NordPool. Monthly averages are calculated from hourly data on
working days only9 from 1999 to 2010.10 I chose to use the spot market because it provides the longest
electricity price time series, but I also tested the estimations with forward contracts and futures
electricity prices for the time periods for which these series are available. I found similar results as
8 The addition of a significantly larger wind power capacity in December 2002 is explained by the fact that it was the
last month the feed-in tariff regime was in place. This is consistent with the clear preference of wind power producers
for guaranteed tariffs, as mentionned in Section 3.2.1.
9 Data on working days only are used instead of data on all days, as the latter are available from 2002 only while the
former are available from 1999 onwards. Regressions were run on the time period 2002-2010 with the two electricity price
series. No significant difference was observed. Average is done on available data: West Denmark only from 01/07/1999
to 28/09/2000 and West and East Denmark from 29/09/2000.
10 The comparison between the averages on electricity price when weighted with hourly wind power production (hourly
wind power production data are found on energinet.dk) and the simple averages proved that the difference between them
was not significant. This allowed taking simple averages in the econometric analysis.
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with the spot price average. Monthly averages are corrected for inflation11 so that all figures are in
constant e2000. Electricity price data are reported in appendix.
The support variable is defined as the amount of money received by wind power producers for each
kWh produced in addition to electricity price. It includes the 3 e/MWh allowance for balancing costs
mentioned in Section 2. When the support policy is a feed-in tariff, I define Supportt as the difference
between the feed-in tariff and the electricity price at time t. Hence for the feed-in tariff period (20002002), the support variable is defined as the difference between the electricity price and 61 e/MWh
(sum of 58 e/MWh of feed-in tariff and 3 e/MWh allowance for balancing costs). Electricity price
is never above 61 e/MWh in that time period. When the support policy is a variable premium, I
define Supportt as a function of the electricity price and the maximal value of the premium. For
the time period 2003-2004, given the variable premium policy presented in Section 2, three cases are
considered. For the months for which electricity price is above 48 e/MWh, the support variable is
defined as 3 e/MWh (balancing cost allowance only). For the months for which electricity price is
below 35 e/MWh, the support variable is defined as 16 e/MWh corresponding to 13 e of premium in
addition to 3 e of balancing costs allowance. For the months for which electricity price is between 35
and 48 e/MWh, the support is defined as the difference between electricity price and 48 e in addition
to the 3 e allowance for balancing costs. When the support policy is a fixed premium, Supportt is
defined as the value of the premium. For the time period from 2005 to February 20th 2008, the support
variable is defined as 16 e/MWh corresponding to 13 e/MWh of fixed premium and 3 e of balancing
cost allowance. For the time period after February 21st 2008, the support is defined as 37 e/MWh
corresponding to 34 e/MWh of fixed premium in addition to 3 e of balancing cost allowance. As is
done for the electricity price, the support premium is then corrected for inflation so that all figures are
in constant e2000.
For the cost term, yearly wind power investment cost data from the European Wind Energy Association
are used as a proxy (Moccia et al., 2011). They are also corrected for inflation, so that Elecpricet ,
Supportt and Costt are all in real terms in the database.
Rt is the interest rate of Danish ten-year government bonds (source : OECD).
Regarding endogeneity concerns, Yt might have an impact on Elecpricet without lag. For the premium
time period (after 2002), this is not a problem since what is tested in the analysis is the possible impact
of electricity price projections at the date when the decision to build a turbine is made. These electricity
price projections are based on past electricity prices. Yt cannot have an impact on past electricity prices
due to the causality principle. In this time period, endogeneity concerns between Yt and the support
variable are also excluded. Yt is defined monthly as the presence or absence of connections of new
turbines to the grid each month while the support policy changes every two or three years. The fact
that new turbines are connected to the grid at time t cannot impact the support policy at the exact
same time. In the FIT time period (2000-2002), Supportt is computed from Elecpricet and there
could be endogeneity between Yt and the support variable. However the feed-in tariff does provide a
premium and the question remains whether the level of implicit premium matters. Tests with lags both
for the electricity price and support variables allowed addressing this concern. The dummy variable
FIT helps to control for this situation. Regressions were run on the whole time period as well as on the
post-FIT period only (after 2002) and the results from the regression on the whole time period remain
robust on the post-2002 period (this point is discussed at the end of Section 3.4.1). The correlation
table is given in Appendix.
The database does not include particularly small turbines (turbine capacity less than 20 kW or hub
height less than 20 m).
11 Inflation data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, end of period consumer
prices.
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3.4

Results and interpretation

Regression results from the probit and tobit analysis are presented. In order to understand and
interpret the probit estimations, the probability distribution they quantify is drawn. It is found that
the support level and policy type are the dominant parameters that explain new turbine connections
to the grid. Past electricity prices have no significant impact. A feed-in tariff significantly brings
more wind power in than a premium policy. No clear difference is observed between the impacts of
a fixed and a variable premium on the decision to connect new turbines. This can be nuanced by
the fact that, for the variable premium regime time period (2003-2004), Supportt is nearly always the
full value of the premium (electricity prices are rather low), and hence the variable premium actually
presented little variability. The cost term does not present any significant impact in the analysis. The
site availability does not have a clear effect either. The interest rate effect is not visible in the probit
analysis but it is significant in the tobit estimations.
3.4.1

Probit estimations

Table 2 presents the results of a sample of six representative probit regressions of Y on the explanatory
variables introduced in Section 3.2.1. Lags for electricity prices are tested from six months to five years.
Results for one or two-year lags only are presented. Regressions (A) and (E) use a twelve-month
lag for electricity price while regressions (B), (C), and (F) use a two-year lag for electricity prices.
Regressions (A) includes the interaction term between Supportt and the dummy variable V P while
the other regressions do not. Regressions (A), (B) and (F) include the cost term without lag, while
regression (C) include a one-year lag for it. Regression (A) to (D) include the interest rate, regression
(E) includes it with a one-year lag. Regressions (A) to (D) include T otT b, the proxy for the sites
availability. As regression (D) presents the highest W ald χ2 test statistics, it is chosen for calculating
the probability distribution of observing the connection of new turbines to the grid as a function of
the support level and policy type. This distribution is plotted in Figure 2.
The support level has a clear impact on the decision to build and connect new turbines to the grid.
The corresponding coefficient is always significant (z-value above 2 and p-value below 1%).
The policy type impact is tested through the dummy variables F IT and V P , with or without interaction terms. The reference category is the fixed premium regime. The variables associated with
the feed-in tariff regime, F IT and Support ∗ F IT , have a significant impact on the probability to
observe the connection of new turbines to the grid, while the variables associated with the variable
premium regime do not.12 Under a feed-in tariff regime, the probability of observing new turbines
connections to the grid is larger than under a premium regime, for the same equivalent level of support.
This is consistent with the fact that a feed-in tariff regime insures revenue certainty to wind power
producers. This observation is in line with previous observations on the impact of feed-in tariffs on
renewable energy (Menz and Vachon, 2006 or Couture et al., 2010). The 2008 IEA report Deploying
Renewables: Principles for Effective Policies (IEA, 2008) also concludes that, for on-shore wind power,
the most effective policies to attain deployment are feed-in tariff regimes, even with relatively modest
remuneration levels.13
No clear difference is found between the impacts of the variable and fixed premium regimes.
Past electricity prices do not have a significant impact on the connection of new turbines to the grid.14
12 Given the electricity price data in the time period 2003-2004, the interaction term between V P and Support is
t
nearly collinear with the dummy variable V P . The regression results confirm that the inclusion of this interaction term
does not improve the explanatory power of the model.
13 This IEA report bases its analysis on the comparison between national support policies and effective deployment of
renewable energy.
14 The use of forward contracts electricity price rather than spot prices was tested. It does not change the results.
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Table 2: Probit regressions of Y , the observation or absence of observation of new turbines connections
to the grid.

Support
VP
FIT
Support*FIT
Support*VP
Cost

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

0.1006***
(3.22)
-10.52

0.0965***
(2.61)
2.288***

0.0705**
(2.05)
1.497

0.0995***
(3.89)
0.3705

0.0896***
(3.57)
0.0979

0.0961***
(3.38)
0.5004

(-1.21)
5.7011**
(2.39)

(2.12)
13.806***
(3.15)

(1.61)
11.13***
(2.76)

(0.95)
3.9693***
(3.84)

(0.21)
3.7402***
(4.08)

(0.57)
10.934***
(3.22)

-0.1071
(-1.55)
0.8483

-0.2475**
(-2.15)

-0.2337**
(-2.03)

-0.1087**
(-2.08)

-0.0977***
(-3.17)

-0.2871***
(-2.93)

(1.39)
0.0025
(0.77)

0.0056*
(1.7)

Cost(-12)
Elecprice(-12)

0.001
(0.38)
0.0028
(1.11)

0.0243

0.0228

(1.39)
Elecprice(-24)
R

-0.7314*
(0.38)

(1.41)
0.0147

0.0084

(0.93)
-0.8331**
(-2.1)

(0.52)
-0.8706**
(-1.85)

0.0116
(0.7)
-0.5315
(-1.62)

R(-12)

0.1206
(0.36)

TotTb

-0.0003

0.00424

0.0009

-0.0016

Constant

(-0.1)
-2.1038
(-0.14)

(0.67)
-24.67
(-0.91)

(0.15)
-6.2745
(-0.24)

(-0.91)
6.7258
(0.87)

-3.074**
(-2.06)

-3.7668
(-0.9)

39.74***
0.3326
122

49.03***
0.3036
110

47.46***
0.2945
110

49.82***
0.3263
128

40.08***
0.3000
122

49.1***
0.2664
110

Wald χ2
Pseudo R2
Observations

Note: The z-value corresponding to each coefficient is indicated in parenthesis below the
coefficient value. ***, ** , and * respectively indicate a 1, 5, and 10% significance level.
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The cost term impact is not visible in the probit analysis; the site availability does not have any
significant effect either. The coefficient associated with the interest rate is significant in regressions
(A) to (C) but it is not significant in regressions (D) to (E). The impact of the interest rate is clearer
in the tobit estimations presented in Section 3.4.2.
To interpret and understand the coefficients from the probit analysis, the marginal effect of the support
level and the support policy type is computed. The predicted probability of observing new turbines
connections to the grid is plotted as a function of the support level and type and presented in Figure
2. The choice is made to present the graph associated with regression (D) as it is the one with the
highest W ald χ2 . The robustness of the curves as a function of the regression chosen is discussed
afterwards. For the “Mean” curve, the value at each point is the average, on all observations, of the
predicted probability calculated using the specific value for the support variable and the sample values
for the other predictor variables.15 For the “Feed-in tariff ”, “Variable premium” and “Fixed premium”
curves, the predicted probability of having new connections depending on the policy type is computed
for each support level, using the average values for the other explanatory variables.
This shows that the probability of investment increases with the support level regardless of the form
it takes. This form makes a considerable difference with the feed-in tariff increasing probability considerably. The extra benefit of this form diminishes as the support level increases. The “Mean” curve
shows that, on average, the probability of observing new turbine connections to the grid is 50% for
a support level of 20 e/MWh. Under a feed-in tariff regime, the probability is higher for the same
support level, while it is lower under a premium policy. For example, for a support level of 30 e/MWh,
the probability of new connections is 0.84 on average, but it is 0.95 under a feed-in tariff regime. “Fixed
premium” and “Variable premium” curves are not significantly different. For the “Feed-in tariff ” curve,
the part of the graph corresponding to support values below 30 e/MWh is not robust as it is nearly
an out-of-sample extrapolation (for the feed-in tariff period, the support variable is above 30 e/MWh
except for two months). The probability difference of observing connection of new turbines to the grid
between the fixed premium and the feed-in tariff regimes can be seen as the benefit of certainty on
the electricity price revenue. Indeed, under a fixed premium regime, wind power producers know the
exact premium level but the electricity price uncertainty remains. Under a feed-in tariff regime, there
is certainty on the whole amount they receive, which is equivalent to certainty on both the electricity
price and the premium.
The robustness of the probit results is now discussed. The support level needed to observe new turbines
connections to the grid with a probability of 50% is deduced from regression (D). It is 20 e/MWh on
average. With the other regressions, this value varies between 19 and 22 e/MWh. Under a premium
regime, this value varies between 24 and 28 e/MWh. The “Mean”, “Variable premium”, and “Fixed
premium” curves as well as the part of the “Feed-in tariff ” curve above 30 e/MWh do not change
significantly if they are inferred from the other regressions. On the contrary, the part of the “Feedin tariff ” curve below 30 e/MWh is not robust, as previously explained. The ranges of probability
for each curve at 5, 25 and 45 e/MWh are presented in Table 3. These ranges take account of the
standard errors defined when computing the predicted probability as a function of the support level
and the support policy type, for each regression. This confirms the fact that the difference between
the impacts of a variable premium and a fixed premium regime is not visible in this analysis. Despite
the fact that the part of the “Feed-in tariff ” curve for low support level is not robust, the feed-in tariff
regime still does bring more wind power in than other schemes.
Regressions were also done on the post feed-in tariff period (after 2002) to test the relative impact
of the support and electricity price if the analysis is done on these years only. The support level
15 For each point of the “Mean” curve, for example for a support level of 5 e/MWh, the regression coefficients are
used to calculate a probability for each observation. This computation takes account of the specific value for the support
variable (5 e/MWh) and the observation values for the other predictors. Then, these probabilities for all observations
are averaged to give the value that appears on the curve (ex: 0.07 for a support level of 5 e/MWh). The advantage of
this curve is that it uses the diversity of all observations for the explanatory variables other than the support level or
the support policy type.

15

Probability of New Turbines Connections to the Grid

1
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
Mean

0,3

Fixed premium
0,2
Variable premium
0,1

Feed-in tariff

0
0

10

20
30
Support Level (€/MWh)

40

50

Figure 2: Probability of new turbine connections to the grid as a function of the support policy level
and the policy type.
Table 3: Ranges of predicted probabilities of observing new connections of turbines to the grid, as a
function of the support level and the policy type, and for all regressions reported in Table 2.
Support level

5 e/MWh

25 e/MWh

45 e/MWh

Mean

0.00-0.34

0.54-0.82

0.92-1.00

Fixed premium

0.00-0.26

0.16-0.68

0.61-0.96

Variable premium

0.00-0.69

0.10-0.85

0.16-0.86

Feed-in tariff

0.71-0.96

0.85-0.99

0.99-1.00

remains the dominant factor and past electricity prices do not have a significant and robust impact.
In addition, the support level for which the probability of observing new turbines connection to the
grid is 0.5 remains in the range indicated by the regressions on the entire time period.
3.4.2

Tobit estimations

The results from the tobit regressions of the additional wind power capacity connected to the grid each
month are presented in Table 4. The tobit analysis complements the probit estimations by quantifying
the relative impact of each explanatory variable.
As in the probit analysis, the tobit regressions show that the support level and the support policy type
have a significant impact, with a feed-in tariff regime bringing more wind power in that a fixed premium
policy. The tobit analysis suggest that a feed-in tariff regime increases the additional capacity installed
monthly by several tens MW (28 MW according to regression (J) estimates if I consider an average
support level of 37 e/MWh) while each additional e/MWh of support increases the additional capacity
16

Table 4: Tobit regressions of the additional wind power capacity connected to the grid each month.
AddCap

(G)

(H)

(I)

(J)

(K)

(L)

Support

779***
(2.66)
-356390*

486**
(2.17)
18928**

1669***
(4.81)
-200430

663**
(2.36)
-187772

1034***
(3.99)
1645*

1636***
(4.67)
16310

(-1.34)
100390***
(3.72)

(2.05)
71592***
(3.23)

(-0.75)
40805
(1.44)

(-0.95)
68604***
(4.07)

(0.23)
60361***
(2.72)

(1.37)
33914
(1.18)

-1039
(-1.39)
15816**

-1090*
(-1.82)
14346

-1856***
(-3.13)

-938.6
(-1.17)

(0.82)
50.21
(1.48)

(1)
-5.326
(-0.23)

39.43
(1.09)

VP
FIT
Support*FIT
Support*VP
Cost

-1155*
(-1.71)
27231
(1.4)
51.94
(1.61)

37.75
(1.36)

Cost(-12)

15.05
(0.78)

Elecprice(-12)

343*
(1.8)

Elecprice(-24)

157.86

131.44

R

(1.1)
-6298**
(-2.05)

(0.89)
-5542*
(-1.77)

172.57
(1.1)
-10355**
(-2.42)

-5943*
(-1.85)

R(-12)

-12017***
(-2.79)
-662.7483
(-0.21)

TotTb

95.94**

129***

-43.11

56.19*

Dec02

(1.82)
177554***
(9.2)

(3.12)
197015***
(11.14)

(-2.39)
246058***
(10.8)

(1.79)
184168***
(10.07)

187478***
(9.27)

(-1.73)
250305***
(10.83)

Constant

-469840*
(-1.92)

-588629***
(-3.01)

117162
1.12

-247070*
(-1.8)

-16796
(-0.46)

203790
(1.13)

LR χ2

152.26***

145.44***

157.88***

160.69***

140.47***

140.71***

0.1128
110

0.1077
110

0.0892
128

0.1096
116

0.104
110

0.0868
122

Pseudo R2
Observations

-61.37**

Note: The t-value corresponding to each coefficient is indicated in parentheses below the coefficient
value. ***, **, and * respectively indicate a 1, 5, and 10% significance level.
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installed by several hundred kW (up to more than 1600 kW if I consider the results from regression
(I)). This confirms that the revenue certainty provided by a feed-in tariff regime is determinant for
wind power deployment. The variable premium impact is not clearly different from the fixed premium
effect. The coefficients associated with the cost and electricity price terms are not significant. The
proxy for the site availability does not present a clear effect.
While the interest rate effect was not obvious in the probit analysis, it appears in the tobit regressions:
when the interest rate increases by one percentage point, the additional capacity installed monthly
decreases by 5 to 12 MW. This is explained by the fact that when the interest rate is low, it is less
costly for wind power producers to borrow money to build new turbines, while, when it is higher,
borrowing is more expensive.
Finally, the Dec02 dummy variable coefficient is always significant. Its value is beyond 177 MW. This
is related to the fact that an unusually large number of turbines was installed in December 2002,
i.e. before the support policy changes from a feed-in tariff to a premium regime. This observation
corroborates the previous results on the impact of a feed-in tariff policy. These results reflect the
preference of wind power producers for a guaranteed tariff, which provides them a higher revenue
certainty than the other schemes.
To conclude, both tobit and probit results indicate that the dominant parameters for the decision to
connect new turbines to the grid are the support level and policy type. A feed-in tariff policy brings
more wind power in than a premium regime. No difference is observed between a fixed and a variable
premium regime. On average, a support level of 20 e/MWh16 in addition to electricity price leads
to a probability of 0.5 to observe connections of new turbines to the grid. Under a premium regime,
this threshold value is around 24 e/MWh. Tobit estimations indicate that the fact that the support
policy is a feed-in tariff rather than a premium increases the additional capacity installed each month
by up to several tens MW, while for each additional e/MW of support, it increases by several hundred
kW. This finding is also consistent with the observation that an usually large number of turbines was
installed in Denmark in December 2002, just before the wind support policy changes from a feed-in
tariff to a premium regime. The support type seems to have more effect than the support level. Such
a result is explained by the revenue certainty provided by a guaranteed tariff to wind power producers.
It is consistent with Mulder’s conclusion (2008) that the remuneration level alone is not enough to
attain wind power deployment.
The interest rate effect is not clear in the probit analysis but visible in the tobit regressions: when the
interest rate increases by one percentage point, the additional capacity installed monthly decreases by
5 to 10 MW. Electricity price effect is not visible in the analysis, nor is the investment cost impact.
Regarding the cost term, the absence of visible impact might be related to the fact that the wind
potential of the site where the turbine is built is not taken into account in the proxy. Indeed, it cannot
be defined for the months during which no new turbine is connected to the grid although it matters
for the levelized cost. The sites availability does not appear to be a dominant factor in the analysis.
The carbon price inference conducted in the following section uses the critical support level value
provided by the probit analysis as the support level needed to observe the connection of new turbines
to the grid with a probability of 0.5.

4

Carbon price inference

The econometric analysis presented in Section 3 provides indications on the conditions under which
there is wind power deployment. It focuses on wind power producers only, as most of the wind capacity
in Denmark is owned by individual entities such as farmers. Projections in electricity prices do not
16 All

support level figures indicated from the regression results are in constant e2000.
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have a significant impact while the support level and policy type clearly matter. The probit regressions
show that, on average, a support of 20 e/MWh leads to a probability of 0.5 to observe new connections
of turbines to the grid. Under a premium policy, this probability is attained for a support level of
24 e/MWh. The purpose of this section is to infer the necessary condition on the carbon price level
to make companies that also operate gas or coal power plants be equally attracted by wind power
projects. While carbon price is a penalty for fossil technologies, a renewable energy support policy
is an advantage for wind power. The purpose of the following paragraphs is to infer the necessary
carbon price that would provide comparable price advantage to wind power over fossil technologies
as the effective support policies. The comparison between wind power and fossil technologies can
be conducted in various ways. I first compare the profit for each kWh produced by the two types
of technologies. I then extend this comparison to the lifetime profit of two installations, taking into
account the different capacity credits and capacity factors of the two types of technology. I finally
compare the returns on investment expected from renewable and fossil energy power projects. Such
comparisons may not take account of some other factors that also play a major role for the deployment
of some specific technologies (for example grid development or portfolio management within energy
companies).

4.1

Comparison between renewable energy and fossil fuel technologies

Using the notations introduced in Section 3.1, I first compare the profit per kWh produced by each
type of technology.
Πr = Πf

(11)

P r + X r − C r = P f − C f − Ef

(12)

Xr + Ef = Pf − Cf − (Pr − Cr)

(13)

Equation 13 shows an equivalence between Xr and Ef with regard to the profit per kWh comparison
between wind power and conventional thermal energy. If the carbon market alone has to cover the
difference in profitability between the two kinds of technology, we have:
Ef = Pf − Cf − (Pr − Cr)

(14)

Pr − Cr can be deduced from the results of the econometric analysis. Indeed, the probit technique
indicates the support level needed to make wind power producers have a positive profit. With the same
notations as in Equation 3.1, the reasoning is the following. The positive profit condition expressed in
equation 15 translates into a condition on Xr as expressed in equation 17.
Πr > 0

(15)

Pr + X r − C r > 0

(16)

Xr > Xr∗

(17)

with
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Xr∗ = Cr − Pr .

(18)

The probit analysis provides indications on Xr∗ : it is around 24 e/MWh under a premium policy.
From equations 14 and 18, we deduce that, if a technology f becomes profitable (Pf − Cf = 0), the
emission penalty needed to make technology r competitive is equal to Xr∗ .
I now compare the lifetime profit of two types of installation. I take into account a new constraint
related to the difference in capacity credit and capacity factor between intermittent and fossil energy.
Due to its intermittency, a kWh of wind power is indeed not a perfect substitute of a kWh produced by
a coal or gas plant. Wind power has a capacity factor of about 25-30% while a base load power plant
has a capacity factor of about 90%. The amount of conventional reserve capacity that can be retired
when wind capacity is added to the system without affecting the system security or robustness can be
expressed as a percentage of this wind capacity. This defines the wind power capacity credit, CCr . At
low levels of penetration, the capacity credit of wind power is about the same as its capacity factor.
When wind penetration increases, the capacity credit drops. In other words, a wind power installation
of capacity Capr can replace a conventional power installation of capacity Capf = CCr ∗ Capr .
If I express the equalization between the lifetime profit of the two kinds of installations under this new
constraint, I obtain:
Capf ∗ CFf ∗ Tf ∗ 8760 ∗ (Pf − Cf − Ef ) = Capr ∗ CFr ∗ Tr ∗ 8760(Pr + Xr − Cr )

(19)

CCr ∗ Capr ∗ CFf ∗ Tf ∗ (Pf − Cf − Ef ) = Capr ∗ CFr ∗ Tr ∗ (Pr + Xr − Cr )

(20)

with
Capr is the renewable energy project capacity (in kW),
Capf is the conventional power project capacity (in kW),
Tr is the typical lifetime of a renewable energy project (in years),
Tf is the typical lifetime of a conventional power plant (in years),
CFr is the capacity factor for a renewable energy technology (around 30% for wind power),
CFf is the capacity factor for a fossil technology (85% for coal or gas plants),
8760 is the number of hours in a year,
Pr , Xr , Cr , Pf , Ef , and Cf are the levelized variables defined in Section 3.1.
After calculations, I obtain:
Ef + βXr = Pf − Cf − β(Pr − Cr)

(21)

with
β=

CFr ∗ Tr
CFf ∗ Tf ∗ CCr

(22)

Equation 21 can be seen as an equivalence between Ef and βXr with regards to the lifetime profit
comparison between a wind power installation and a fossil fuel power plant with equivalent impact on
the power system security.
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Finally, I compare the returns on investment of the two types of technologies. Using the same notations
as above, I define the return on investment for renewable energy as follows:
ROIr =

Capr ∗ CFr ∗ Tr ∗ 8760
∗ (Pr + Xr − Cr )
Capr ∗ Ir0

(23)

where
ROIr is the return on investment for renewable energy,
Ir0 is the initial investment cost per kW installed (e/kW).
For a fossil technology in a context where carbon is priced (either by a tax or through a trading
scheme), there is no premium but there is an emission penalty so that the return on investment is:
ROIf =

Capf ∗ CFf ∗ Tf ∗ 8760
∗ (Pf − Ef − Cf )
Capf ∗ If0

(24)

where
ROIf is the return on investment for the fossil technology considered,
If0 is the initial investment cost per kW installed (e/kW).
The equalization between the returns on investment for renewable energy and fossil technology17 leads
to:
α(Pr + Xr − Cr ) = Pf − Ef − Cf
(25)
with
α=

If0 ∗ CFr ∗ Tr
Ir0 ∗ CFf ∗ Tf

and hence:
Ef + αXr = Pf − Cf − α(Pr − Cr )

(26)

This relation can be seen as an equivalence between Ef and αXr with regards to the return on
investment comparison between a wind power installation and a fossil fuel power plant.
If an emission penalty alone has to make renewable energy projects as attractive as fossil technologies
installations, the relation becomes:
Ef = Pf − Cf − α(Pr − Cr )

(27)

From equations 27 and 18, we obtain:
Ef = Pf − Cf + αXr∗

(28)

If an emitting power production technology f becomes profitable (Pf − Cf = 0), αXr∗ is the necessary
emission penalty to make the return on investment of a wind power projects as attractive as the return
for this technology.
17 As the capacity term appears both in the nominator and denominator of the return on investment, the capacity
credit term does not appear in this equalization.
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The three comparisons presented in these sections provides three conditions on the emission penalty
needed to be make wind power equally attractive as conventional thermal technologies. Given the
quantity of carbon dioxide emitted for each kWh of electricity produced by coal or gas plants, this
emission penalty can be converted into a carbon price.
However, as shown in the results of the econometric analysis, the revenue certainty is an important
factor for investment in wind power. In this perspective, any necessary condition indicated here is
to be used with caution. The price stability provided by a carbon tax could be compared with the
stability of a premium received on top of the market electricity price. A carbon price set by a market
presents more variability than a carbon tax. A feed-in tariff provides higher revenue certainty (it can
be seen as a regime that provides a premium on top of a fixed electricity price).

4.2

Carbon price inference from regression results

For the numerical application of the relations presented above, I assume that the lifetime of a fossil
fuel power plant is 40 years, while it is 20 years for a wind turbine. I assume a capacity factor of 85%
for coal and gas plants, 30% for wind turbines, and a capacity credit of 30% for wind power. I consider
an initial investment cost of 1100 e/kW for wind power and 1000 e/kW for fossil technologies. This
gives a value of 0.16 for α, and a value of 0.58 for β.
The econometric analysis shows that, under a premium regime, the support level needed to observe
connection of new turbines to the grid with probability 0.5 is around 24 e/MWh. This is converted
in an emission penalty of 24 e/MWh according to equation 13, 14 e/MWh according to equation
21, and 3.8 e/MWh according to equation 28. The most stringent condition is the one provided by
equation 13. I use the result from it for the conversion of the emission penalty into a carbon price.
If I consider that electricity production from coal emits 0.85 tons of CO2 /MWh (Sijm, Neuhoff, and
Chen, 2006) and that electricity production from gas (combined cycle) emits 0.48 tons of CO2 /MWh, a
support level of 24 e/MWh provides a price advantage to wind power producers that is equivalent to a
carbon price of 28 e/ton if competing with electricity production from coal, and 50 e/ton if competing
with electricity production from gas. However, one of the main conclusions of the econometric analysis
conducted in Section 3 is that a feed-in tariff significantly brings more wind power in than a premium.
This result underlines the importance of revenue certainty for wind power investors. In addition, the
carbon price set by a market also presents significant volatility. As a consequence a carbon price alone
may not provide revenue certainty equivalent to such policies. A higher carbon price than the figures
provided here might be needed to provide wind power producers with comparable advantage over fossil
technologies as the existing effective wind support policies.18

5

Conclusion

The purpose of the work presented here is to use the Danish experience to conduct an empirical
analysis of the conditions that attain renewable energy deployment and to infer a carbon price level
that would provide a price advantage to wind energy over fossil fuel technologies comparable to the
advantage provided by the support level under which new turbines are connected to the grid. The
analysis is focused on on-shore wind power in the context of a liberalized Danish electricity market,
in the time period 2000-2010. Probit and tobit econometric techniques are used to test the drivers of
wind power deployment on a monthly basis. The potential factors influencing it are identified by the
profit function of wind energy. Probit technique is used to estimate the effects of the support policy
18 Previous analysis demonstrated the importance of long range energy policy in stabilizing the conditions required
for renewable energy development (Meyer, 2007). More work on uncertainty and wind power investment could be done,
based on more general research on uncertainty and irreversible investment, following Favero et al. (1992).

22

type and level, electricity price projections, investment cost, interest rate and sites availability on the
observation of connection of new turbines to the grid. Tobit technique is used to assess the impacts of
the same factors on the additional capacity installed each month.
The analysis shows that the support level and policy type are the dominant parameters. A feed-in
tariff policy has a significantly larger impact than a premium policy. A variable premium does not have
a significantly different impact from a fixed premium. The effect of electricity price projections is not
significant in this analysis. Neither are the effects of investment cost or sites availability. The interest
rate impact is significant in the tobit analysis but does not appear to be so in the probit estimations.
The probit analysis indicates that, on average, a 20 e/MWh support in addition to electricity price
is necessary to observe connections of new turbines to the grid with a probability of 0.5. Under a
premium policy this probability is reached for a support policy of 24 e/MWh. The observation that
a feed-in tariff policy brings more wind power in than a premium policy is related to the revenue
certainty insured by a fixed tariff. It is consistent with previous analysis reported in the literature
(Menz and Vachon, 2006; Couture et al., 2010).
The absence of visible effect of the cost term might be related to the fact that, although the levelized
cost of wind power depends on the wind potential of the site where the turbine is built, the wind power
density is not taken into account in the analysis as it cannot be defined for the months during which
no new turbine is connected to the grid.
The tobit analysis shows that the additional capacity installed each month increases by up to thousand
kW for each additional e/MWh of support. The fact that the support policy is a feed-in tariff rather
than a premium increases the additional capacity installed each month by up to several tens MW.
When the interest rate increases by one percentage point, the additional capacity installed monthly
decreases by 5 to 12MW . The tobit analysis also allows taking into account the specificity of December
2002, when a large additional wind power capacity was installed before the replacement of the feed-in
tariff by a premium regime. The tobit estimations confirm the strength of a feed-in tariff regime to
support wind power deployment. The final inference with regard to carbon price is based on the figures
from the probit analysis.
The comparison between the profits expected from renewable projects and fossil fuel power plants is
used to infer a carbon price that would provide wind power producers with comparable price advantage
over gas or coal plant owners as the support level previously mentioned. This induces an equivalence
relationship between a support premium and an emission penalty. Under certainty revenue equivalence,
the support level of 20 e/MWh indicated above can be converted into an equivalent carbon price of
23 e/ton if renewable energy competes with electricity production from coal or 41 e/ton if it competes
with electricity production from gas. The support level threshold of 24 e/MWh observed under a
premium regime is equivalent to a carbon price of 28 e/t if renewable energy competes with coal, and
50 e/t if it competes with gas.
This figures are higher than the EUA price observed in the second phase of the EU ETS but still in
the same order of magnitude. In terms of variability, a carbon tax may be seen as comparable to a
premium on top of a market electricity price. A carbon market price presents more variability. That
would result in a higher necessary carbon price.
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Appendices
A. Electricity price and support variables
Figure 3: Real electricity price in Denmark and definition of the support variable.
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Note : Monthly averages are calculated from Nordpool hourly data on working days.
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B. Correlation table of the explanatory variables used in the probit and tobit regressions
Table 5: Correlation table of the variables used in the regressions.

Y
AddCap
Support
Elecprice(-12)
VP
FIT
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R
Cost
TotTb

Y
1
0.3919***
(0.0000)
0.5575***
(0.0000)
-0.0818
(0.3702)
-0.2542***
(0.0038)
0.4906***
(0.0000)
0.2838***
(0.0012)
-0.2800***
(0.0014)
-0.3823***
(0.0000)

AddCap

Support

Elecprice(-12)

VP

FIT

R

Cost

TotTb

1
0.2736***
(0.0018)
-0.1284
(0.1587)
-0.1748**
(0.0484)
0.4555***
(0.0000)
0.3309***
(0.0001)
-0.2328***
(0.0082)
-0.4154***
(0.0000)

1
-0.3198***
(0.0003)
-0.4238***
(0.0000)
0.7624***
(0.0000)
0.6039***
(0.0000)
-0.3156***
(0.0003)
-0.7429***
(0.0000)

1
0.0306
(0.7378)
-0.5152***
(0.0000)
-0.3723***
(0.0000)
0.4244***
(0.0000)
0.5613***
(0.0000)

1
-0.3005***
(0.0006)
0.0055
(0.9510)
-0.4063***
(0.0000)
0.1685*
(0.0573)

1
0.7980***
(0.0000)
-0.6116***
(0.0000)
-0.8546***
(0.0000)

1
-0.4592***
(0.0000)
-0.8209***
(0.0000)

1
0.4079***
(0.0000)

1
-

Note: P-values are given in (); *, **, and *** respectively refer to the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels of the estimated coefficients.

C. Wind power generation in Denmark

Figure 4: On-shore wind power generation in Denmark since its early stage.
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